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Abstract: This article asks whether and why, in a system lacking electoral incentives to cultivate
personal votes, MPs might choose to signal to geographic constituents. It explores this question by
analysing the number of written parliamentary questions submitted to the Portuguese parliament
on two issues – unemployment and crime – between 2009 and 2015, and asking if MPs are more
inclined to table questions on specific issues when their districts suffer particularly from related
problems. The article finds evidence that constituency-level problem pressure does matter for the
signalling activities of MPs, although policy specialization remains the main driver of their issue
emphasis. This finding contributes new knowledge to the ongoing debate on the factors accounting
for the representative relationship between MPs and constituents, by drawing attention to the
importance of district-level problem pressure as one of the drivers of issue sponsorship in
parliament.
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Introduction
For a long time, legislative studies have been interested in understanding what drives the
behaviour of members of parliament (MPs). Assuming that their primary motivation is to
remain in office (Strøm 1997), MPs will seek to maximize their chances of holding on to
their position by catering to the interests of those who decide the outcome of their election
(Mansbridge 2003). Depending on the electoral rules (Andre et al. 2014a, b), MPs will
have either more or fewer incentives to consider the concerns of their geographical
constituents, and may therefore cultivate a personal vote. Having said that, whether
institutional mechanisms encourage rather than determine specific courses of action and
how these incentives play out and influence the responsiveness of MPs remains a question
open to empirical investigation (e.g. Fernandes et al. 2019).
This article analyses the sources of the individual responsiveness of MPs towards
geographic constituents by addressing whether and to what extent local problems affect
the decisions of MPs to ask parliamentary questions on related issues. The dyadic
relationship between MPs and their constituents has received much attention recently,
both as a result of empirical findings on party heterogeneity (e.g. Itzkovitch-Malka and
Hazan 2017) and as a reaction to the weakening of party loyalties and the growing
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disconnect between parties and voters (e.g. Mair 2013). Most of these studies focus on
such personal vote-seeking strategies as providing particular ‘pork barrel’ policy benefits to
a constituency or using parliamentary questions to address specific local issues. While also
focusing on parliamentary questions, following Soroka et al. (2009) and Blidook and
Kerby (2011), this article looks at their policy focus rather than at references to particular
local entities: indeed, a considerable number of parliamentary questions have a national
rather than a local focus, but this does not necessarily undermine their value as
constituency signalling devices. Simply put, some problems need to be dealt with
nationally rather than locally. The question we ask is if individual MPs perform
constituency-focused legislative work by asking questions on specific issues when their
district suffers particularly from those problems.
We focus on a least-likely country case, Portugal, where the closed-list proportional
representation (PR) voting system ought to provide MPs with very little incentive to
cultivate personal votes (Carey and Shugart 1995; Lisi and Santana-Pereira 2014). Here,
the parties dominate political life and the links between MPs and their constituents are
very weak. Nevertheless, the results of some important research has shown that even in
party-dominated systems, MPs have some freedom of action from their parties (Leston-
Bandeira 2009) and can engage in geographic representation without compromising party
unity (D€aubler 2018; Fernandes et al. 2017; Louwerse and Otjes 2016; Russo 2011; Zittel
et al. 2019).
Here we measure issue focus in terms of the number of written parliamentary questions
on two issues: unemployment and crime. We focus on written parliamentary questions
because, unlike other forms of legislative activity in Portugal (legislative votes, oral
questions to the Prime Minister and, to some extent, bill sponsorship) which are tightly
controlled by the party, they provide some leeway that enables the MP to advance a
personal agenda (Borghetto and Lisi 2018; Fernandes et al. 2017). Furthermore, there are
no limits to the number of written questions an MP can raise, and drafting a question is
less demanding than drafting a bill or a motion, which makes it an efficient way to
respond to events quickly. Finally, while the policy impact of parliamentary questions is
arguably limited, they are not entirely symbolic tools: they achieve their purpose to the
extent ministers are forced to justify their actions or publish the information requested. All
these attributes make written parliamentary questions an efficient channel for signalling
attention to local constituents.
We analyse attention on unemployment and crime for a number of reasons. First, the
availability of reliable and continuous indicators on these issues across districts.1 Second,
politicians may be held accountable for a deteriorating performance on both fronts, so
they are more likely to pay attention to variations in these statistics. Third, both are
sensitive to “focusing events” (e.g. high-profile murders or massive layoffs) that may draw
additional attention to the problem (Birkland 1998). Fourth, they represent issues that are
traditionally owned both by parties on the left (unemployment) and the right (crime),
thereby ensuring a reasonably broad coverage of Portugal’s ideological spectrum.
1 Although an analysis of the geographic distribution of recorded unemployed people and crime statistics is
beyond the purview of the article, previous studies have noted that the economic geography of Portugal was, and
still is, profoundly divided between communities near the coast and those in the interior (Syrett 2017). Arguably,
these geographic divisions, which have been related to the recent boom in tourism, are associated with different
levels of unemployment and crime across the country.
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To begin with, we investigate the link between geographic constituents and individual
MPs by establishing whether there is a positive and significant correlation between
problem pressure in distinct electoral districts (measured using annual local-level data) and
the absolute number of parliamentary questions asked by those MPs elected in these
districts. We then unravel the motivations behind this relationship by focusing on two
sources of responsiveness: first, the political ties to the district (in terms of positions in
either a local assembly or executive), in which we assume that the MPs’ links to the local
community imply they have stronger bonds with local interests, which should make
signalling to constituencies more credible (Zittel et al. 2019); second, since parliaments and
parties depend on a division of labour to legislate effectively and this encourages MPs to
specialize on specific subjects, we expect MPs will ask more questions on issues that are
problematic in their constituency when they fall within the remit of their assigned
portfolio, which almost always coincides with their committee membership (Andeweg and
Thomassen 2011).
This article is organized as follows. In the following section, we examine existing
literature on the use of parliamentary questions by MPs as a way of signalling to their
constituents and the factors that influence the probability of this behaviour to be observed,
as well as other explanatory factors of policy topic focus in parliamentary questions. We
then set out arguments and hypotheses and provide some background information on the
Portuguese case, followed by a section introducing our data and outlining our
methodological approach. The article concludes with a discussion of the main empirical
patterns observed and their implications for the discussion on personal sources of
responsiveness.
Geographic Representation as Signalling Behaviour Through Parliamentary
Questions
Parliamentary work often takes the form of policy advocacy, with MPs advocating on
behalf of policies (Bertelli and Dolan 2009). However, entities being represented by MPs
policy advocacy behavior, whose demands they wish to represent, may vary. Carey (2007)
argues that political parties and electoral constituencies are the two most important actors
competing for the attention of MPs. This results in two ideal-type forms of representation:
partisan representation, which ‘portrays legislators as members of teams that collectively
represent socially-cohesive national coalitions of voters‘; and dyadic representation, which
views MPs ‘as individual agents accountable to local, and thus geographically-defined,
constituencies‘ (Zittel et al. 2019: 682).
In western European parliamentary democracies, parties tend to be the main focus, with
the extent to which constituencies can compete for the attention of MPs being dependent
on several factors (see Fernandes et al. 2019; Zittel et al. 2019). As D€aubler eloquently
puts it:
‘MPs may want to work especially on issues important to the party constituency because: (1)
they find these issues important per se; (2) they are in closer contact with party constituents
than with other parts of the citizenry; (3) the candidate selectorate strongly cares about these
matters; or (4) citizens may vote for the party or the candidate as a reward for tackling those
issues. (D€aubler 2018: 4).
We argue that the same set of reasons can be used in the analysis of the local focus of
legislative work, and we test this assumption through the lens of questioning activity. But
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how can MPs use parliamentary questions to signal their geographic constituencies that
they are indeed representing them? The literature provides two possible responses: a
reference to the constituency in the tabled questions, or a focus on topics that are of
particular importance to the geographic constituencies they represent.
Studies operationalizing constituency focus as a direct or implicit reference to the
constituency in the parliamentary question have mapped this phenomenon and sought to
identify those factors that impact the probability of adopting such a focus. The electoral
system (namely whether ballot structures grant voters freedom to cast personal votes) is
believed to be important, with constituency-focused questions being more common in
Ireland than in Italy (2006-08), for example (Martin 2011; Russo 2011). However, electoral
institutions are only part of the story, since even in a context in which the electoral system
rules should not create incentives for MPs to cultivate personal votes, such as in Italy
(2006-08), one-third of parliamentary questions were constituency-focused (Russo 2011).
The electoral vulnerability of MPs is also thought to be a key element. In Italy, MPs with
prominent leadership roles, who are therefore less vulnerable electorally, are less willing to
perform constituency service, since it will not necessarily improve their chances of being
reselected by their parties (Russo 2011). A recent study on Portugal by Fernandes et al. (2017)
found that electoral vulnerability has an impact on the focus of representation (distinguishing
between district and party-focused parliamentary questions), but only if analysed in
association with the moment in the electoral cycle and the size of the party. However, this is
not the case in either the United Kingdom or Ireland, where the electoral vulnerability of
parliamentary representatives is not associated with a difference in the likelihood of raising
constituency-focused questions (Kellermann 2016; Martin 2011). In a more recent study,
Fernandes et al. (2019) distinguish constituency-focused questions from trustee-style questions
(independent from party or district considerations) and show that electoral vulnerability
increases the likelihood of MPs tabling the former in Portugal and Germany, but encourages
the latter in Ireland. In a study measuring vulnerability as the degree of electoral volatility
linked with the existence of large numbers of non-partisan voters at the district level, Zittel
et al. (2019) note that MPs competing in more volatile constituencies display a greater
tendency to table written questions containing geographic references.
The government versus opposition status is also believed to be a factor, although in this
respect the results are inconsistent: in Italy and Germany, MPs from (some) opposition
parties are more likely to adopt a local focus (Russo 2011; Zittel et al. 2019), while
parliamentary representatives of the governing party in Ireland are more likely to raise
questions that focus on their constituencies (Martin 2011). Members of the European
Parliament from domestic opposition parties are more likely to notify the European
Commission of violations of EU law in their member states (their constituencies) than
MPs from the national parties of government (Jensen et al. 2013). Among other important
variables underlined by these studies, we find: the nature of the political party (parties not
claiming to be national with an electorate concentrated in a specific region are more likely
to adopt a constituency focus) (Russo 2011); the position of the electoral district in the
centre-periphery cleavage (MPs from peripheral districts tend to adopt a more
constituency focus) (Martin 2011); or the centralization of the candidate selection process
(the more centralized candidate selection is, the less likely it is that MPs will focus on the
interests of their districts, with this effect being stronger in Portugal than in Ireland or
Germany) (Fernandes et al. 2019).
There is currently a small, but growing, number of studies investigating this form of
geographic representation in a different way, by focusing on the interplay between district
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specificities and preferences on the one hand, and the content of questions on the other.
For instance, Saalfeld (2011) noted that in the UK, MPs representing constituencies with a
greater presence of visible minorities will ask more questions about diversity and
immigration. In a subsequent study corroborating this finding, Saalfeld and Bischof (2013)
noted that all British MPs, regardless of their own ethnic background, are responsive to
the interests of minority constituents when these are geographically concentrated. In
Canada, Soroka et al. (2009) and Blidook and Kerby (2011) studied the link between a
series of constituency characteristics and preferences and the extent to which questions
tabled by MPs elected in those constituencies mirror these concerns. The authors observe
that such representation is commonly observed, even though it varies from issue to issue,
and often (but not always) MPs facing electoral pressure, or vulnerability (narrow victory
margins), are more prone to engage in this mode of constituency representation via
questions. Other factors that may have an impact on the constituency focus of a specific
topic by parliamentary questions are media coverage (Vliegenthart et al. 2016), the gender
and social identity of MPs (Bird 2005; Saalfeld 2011) or considerations of intra-party
competition (Bevan and John 2016).
While existing research shows parliamentary questions are often used to signal efforts aimed
at representing geographic constituencies, most factors explaining the probability of engaging
in such behaviour deal with the electoral system and/or strategic and electoral considerations
(those related with reasons 3 and 4 D€aubler (2018) uses to explain the MPs’ focus), leaving
the role of personal sources in this process largely ignored (D€aubler’s reasons 1 and 2,
concerning interest and proximity). The existing literature provides direct and indirect support
for both factors, which may moderate the link between constituency characteristics and issue
focus of parliamentary questions. First, the existence of powerful links between the MPs and
their constituency encourages this behaviour: in Italy, MPs who are parachuted into districts
tend to be less focused on the constituencies than those who were born and who live in the
constituency (Russo 2011); while in Germany both biographical localness (MPs who were
born, educated and who live in the district) and political localness (MPs who exercised
executive or legislative roles within the district) increases the odds of tabling questions with a
reference to the electoral district (Zittel et al. 2019). Second, since MPs table questions that
tend to be within the jurisdiction of the committees they belong to (Kellermann 2013; Proksch
and Slapin 2010) or the portfolios or shadow portfolios they hold within their parliamentary
party group (Soroka et al. 2009), expertise may also be a key moderating variable of
constituency-relevant issue focus.
Attending to Constituency Interests: The Responsiveness to Problem Pressure and
the Mediation of Personal Characteristics
The following analysis aims at testing whether and to what extent MPs use written
parliamentary questions to cater to constituency interests. But how do we tap into the elusive
concept of interests? Arguably, a highly valid measurement would be to survey a sample of
citizens from each constituency about their views on the most important problem affecting
their community and build a profile of the local average voter (Waggoner 2019).2 Indeed, as
Wlezien notes, one should distinguish the salience (or prominence) of an issue from whether it
2 Using public survey data is not without its own problems: first, the preferences of constituents may be unstable
and to some extent built on poor information (Fowler and Margolis 2014); second, existing surveys are often
blind to temporal and geographic variations.
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is perceived to be a problem. More specifically, an issue becomes a problem ‘when conditions
are worse than people would like‘ (Wlezien 2005: 560).
In the absence of these direct measurements of voters’ perceptions, we chose to build
indicators of local problem pressure using available local data on the incidence of
unemployment and crime.3 Four criteria led to the selection of the two issues. First, both
issues generate a continuous flow of problem information in the form of official municipal
statistics, allowing tracking variation in problem pressure across both time and districts.
Second, both issues are still largely dealt with at the national and local level, rather than at
the supranational level, so national politicians are likely to be held accountable for not
addressing the problem. Third, both are sensitive to the occasional focusing event (Birkland
1998), which attracts media and voters’ attention and make problems leap into sudden
prominence (e.g. a massive layoff in a big industry or the emergence of a corruption scandal
among civil servants). Having said that, one should be aware that the relative perception of
‘unemployment‘ and ‘crime‘ as problems differs in Portugal.4 Whereas unemployment has
typically ranked at the top of Portuguese voters’ concerns—especially during the years covered
in this study which saw the peak of the Euro crisis—the country has traditionally boasted a
relatively low crime rate. As a result, we should expect politicians to be, on average, more
responsive to variations in unemployment rates. Finally, the two issues appeal to different
sides of the ideological spectrum, which helps ensure our findings are more generalizable.
Drawing on classic theories in the literature of political sociology (e.g. Lipset and Rokkan
1967) and issue competition (e.g. Robertson 1976), the issue of unemployment is traditionally
“owned” by left-wing parties, while crime and order is “owned” by the right.
Our main hypothesis states that MPs ask questions that are either unemployment or crime-
related when indicators on these two issues in their district get worse. First, signalling
attention to their geographic constituents is aimed at enhancing their party’s electoral appeal,
in addition to other partisan vote-getting strategies. Certain re-election-seeking MPs may also
act under the assumption that such activities are valued by party elites and get rewarded with
a high position in the electoral list. Second, the importance of privileged communication links
with the constituency should not be understated in relation to parliamentary questions, since it
is common for local actors to write the text of the question, then pass it to their MP, who
then signs and submits it on their behalf. As a result, our first hypothesis reads as follows:
H1 – The stronger the problem pressure in the district where MPs were elected, the more
questions they will ask about it.
In an effort to tease out the drivers behind the constituency-focused behaviour of MPs,
we test the moderating effect of two MPs’ traits. Both should increase the incentives for
3 This is an indirect measure of issue salience in the constituency similar to that used by Waggoner (2019).
Interestingly, while he reports no consistent direct impact of constituent preferences, measured via survey data, on
the content of bill sponsorship, he detects an impact of district characteristics, measured as the percentage of
constituents working in specific sectors.
4 An appreciation of the relative importance of ‘unemployment‘ and ‘crime‘ can be obtained by using the
responses to the ‘Most Important Problem‘ question that is asked periodically by the Eurobarometer (see Online
Appendix B). In Portugal between 2009 and 2017, unemployment is considered by far the most important issue
facing the country: one respondent in every two puts this issue at the top of the list (average proportion of 51%
and a standard deviation [SD] of 22%). In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis in Portugal that led to the signing
of the financial assistance programme, its importance rose as high as 90% (2010-2012). As for crime, it is
mentioned on average by 14% of the Portuguese respondents (with a SD of 6%), placing it in seventh position
during the period considered (after economic concerns – 34%, inflation – 21%, immigration – 18%, health and
social security – 17% and government debt – 15%).
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the MP to invest in signalling constituency-bound strategies. First, we consider whether
the MP has in the past served in the constituency (Andre et al. 2014a; Shugart et al.
2005).5 Our expectation is that MPs who have served in the district will develop both
stronger ties with the constituency and expertise on local matters, and that they will be
therefore more likely to present themselves as problem-solvers and focus on issues that are
important to the district (Zittel et al. 2019). Second, it might be in the interest of party
elites to use these ‘local‘ MPs as their special and most visible liaisons with the district.
Indeed, Fernandes et al. (2017: 682) already found that in Portugal, “representatives with
local government positions have a higher likelihood of tabling questions for both their
party and their district”. Of course, we acknowledge that such a relationship is built on
public speeches, media appearances and constituency visits, but parliamentary questions
can also be considered one such channel. As a result, we expect that:
H2 – MPs who served as local representatives in their districts should table more questions on
issues related to unemployment and crime in response to their district’s problem pressure.
As we have seen above, in both national and supranational parliaments it is often the
case that policy specialization affects the topics MPs choose to tackle in their
parliamentary questions (Kellermann 2013; Proksch and Slapin 2010). As a result, we take
into consideration a MP’s policy specialization as a moderating factor in the relationship
between constituency-level problem pressure and the number of parliamentary questions
about those issues. Both parliaments and parties benefit from an internal division of
labour, where individual MPs develop expertise over specific policy areas (Krehbiel 1991).
From the point of view of internal organization, this translates into the assignment of
specific policy portfolios to MPs, which often mirrors their committee membership (Martin
2014). Consequently, we posit that membership in a relevant committee should be a strong
predictor of the number of questions MPs table on unemployment and crime when these
are relevant concerns in their districts. What is more, we assume that such a division of
labour should be particularly strict in a party-dominated system such as Portugal, where
MPs are party delegates first and foremost. We therefore expect that:
H3 – MPs who sit in committees with a relevant policy jurisdiction over unemployment and
crime should table more questions on these issues in response to their district’s problem
pressure.
The Personal Sources of Responsiveness in a Party-Dominated System: The Case of
Portugal
The goal of this section is to briefly outline the main characteristics of the Portuguese
parliamentary system and justify why, while it represents a case which is unlikely to
exhibit geographic representation, there is still reason to expect some level of geographic
signalling as a party-led strategy.
Portugal has a single chamber of 230 MPs elected to a four-year legislature. The
country is divided into 22 electoral districts – 18 mainland administrative districts, two
autonomous regions (Azores and Madeira) plus two districts for Portuguese living abroad
(European and rest-of-the-world districts). Four parties have been consistently represented
5 According to the Statute of Members of the Portuguese Parliament (Art. 20), the job of MP is incompatible
with other positions in local and executive assemblies.
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in parliament since the early 1980s (five if we include the Left Bloc from the late 1990s),
making it one of the most stable party systems in Europe (Leston-Bandeira and Freire
2003). Starting from the far left of the political spectrum, we find the coalition between the
Communist (PCP) and the Green (PEV) party, together with the Left Bloc (BE). Both
won around 10% of the seats in the 2015 elections and, for the first time, decided to offer
external support to a minority Socialist government, based upon three written
parliamentary agreements. The centre-left is occupied by the Socialist Party (PS), while on
the right and the centre-right, respectively, are two parties that often govern in coalition,
the smaller People’s Party (CDS-PP) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD).
We argue that Portugal is a least-likely case for testing the presence of geographic
representation in a strong party-dominated system. First, the closed-list PR system used in
Portuguese legislative elections create fewer incentives for MPs to cultivate personal votes
(Carey and Shugart 1995; Lisi and Santana-Pereira 2014) and, therefore, to focus on issues
that are salient to the constituency. This makes Portugal a rather robust setting in which
to test district-level determinants of MPs’ behaviour as opposed to countries adopting
preferential voting systems.
However, despite this institutional framework, it has been shown that there is significant
intra-system variation in terms of constituency focus (looking at attitudinal focus and
hours spent in the constituency compared to time spent in parliament). Specifically, the
latter is negatively correlated with the district magnitude (Freire et al. 2017; Pilet et al.
2012). Second, Portuguese parties tend to display a centralized system for candidate
selection, one in which the national party elites play a very powerful role (Teixeira et al.
2012). However, there are still differences between the parties. The PSD is the least
centralized party for candidate selection, while the PCP is the more centralized party. The
other parties (BE, PS and CDS-PP) lie somewhere between the two extremes.
Data and Methods
The empirical analysis relies on a data set that combines information on the topic of all
written parliamentary questions (‘perguntas ao governo‘) submitted by Portuguese MPs
during the eleventh (2009-2011) and twelfth (2011-2015) legislatures, biographies of those
asking the questions and statistics on the problem pressure of crime and unemployment at
the constituency level (see Table 1 for a summary of variables).6
Dependent Variable
Our two dependent variables are the absolute number of questions asked by an MP on
issues related to crime and unemployment. In Portugal, there are no detailed regulations
concerning the tabling of written parliamentary questions. The Constitution stipulates that
MPs have the authority to “ask questions to the government or to the public
administration about any of its activities and receive an answer within a reasonable time,
with the exception of matters concerning state secrecy” (Article 156d). However, while
written questions (perguntas ao governo) have existed since 1976 (not only in the
constitution, but also in the first draft of the Procedural Rules), they were rarely used
6 Data about biographies and parliamentary questions were retrieved from the parliament’s official website,
www.parlamento.pt.
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during the first 20 years. Prior to 2007, this instrument was largely discredited because the
cabinet member receiving the questions could decide which of them to answer (Leston-
Bandeira 2004). There was also a limit to the number of questions each group could
submit. Unanswered questions were periodically published in parliament’s Official Journal,
but there was little expectation that ministers would actually respond to them. However,
this changed in 2007 (Seguro 2016) when a reform turned this instrument and the request
for information (requerimento) into the two most widely used procedures.7 Currently, the
government is obliged to respond within 30 days and, should this deadline be missed, the
question gets published in the Official Journal as a reminder.
Interviews with MPs confirm that, for the most part, they are not constrained by party
leaders when drafting and submitting written questions to the government (Borghetto and
Lisi 2018; Fernandes et al. 2017). Yet, this does not mean the party does not monitor the
process, rather it means that within these boundaries, MPs are free to direct attention to
their favourite topics. The question asked here is whether they also use these questions to
send signals to their constituencies.
In practical terms, we attribute a question to an MP only if they are the first signatory
(more than one party member can be asked to sign a question). While there are no formal
rules regarding the order of signatories, when asked, MPs confirm that the initiator and
author of the question is generally the first named (Borghetto and Lisi 2018). Additionally,




Absolute number of parliamentary questions on the topic of unemployment and crime signed by the
MP as first sponsor
Independent variables
Problem pressure Across district
Standardization of district indicators in a year
Across time
Percent change of the indicator using the previous year as baseline
MP localness 1 if member of local assembly, executive or mayor before entering parliament; 0
- otherwise
Committee 1 if member of the relevant committee for the topic during the legislature;
0 – otherwise
Controls
Magnitude Number of seats assigned in the electoral district (values are log transformed)
Mandates in
district
Absolute number of terms won by the MP in the electoral district when
he/she was elected
Vulnerability Ratio between the position that the candidate MP holds in the party list and
the number of seats won in that district by the MP’s party
Gender 0 = Male, 1 = Female
Opposition 0 = Government, 1 = Opposition
Party Party of the MP (reference is PS)
7 While “questions to the government” (perguntas ao governo) are instruments of political control that can only
be addressed to government ministers and (less often) senior public officials, “requests for information”
(requerimentos) are information gathering tools that can be directed to national and local public officials.
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there are concerns on whether co-signing a question represents a demonstration of interest
for the topic or whether it is simply a favour for a party colleague. Given this, here we
consider only first signatories.
Our unit of analysis is the MP/session dyad (the full legislative term is split into four
one-year sessions that ordinarily begin in September). Since some MPs are substituted
either temporarily (for example, because of an extended leave) or permanently (230 MPs
are elected to sit in the Portuguese parliament but a total of 313 MPs served during the
twelfth legislature) during the course of the legislature and with the amount of time spent
in parliament affecting the likelihood of asking a question, we filtered out those who were
not present during the entire legislative session. We also removed representatives from the
Green party and the People–Animals–Nature parties (their party groups have less than 3
members) and those elected in the European and rest-of-the-world districts. The final data
set includes 345 individual MPs, each observed on average across four sessions, with a
presence across legislatures as follows: 222 MPs in the eleventh legislature and 253 in the
twelfth. Figures may be higher than 230 because some parliamentary groups (especially the
BE and PCP) substitute a portion of their MPs halfway through the session. Given that
we cover 6 legislative sessions and that there are roughly 210 MPs in each, there are 1265
observations in our sample.
Our complete data set contains 10997 questions: 4315 in the two-year eleventh
legislature and 6682 in the four-year twelfth legislature. Even after filtering out duplicate
questions (for instance, the same question may be asked three times on the same day when
addressed to three ministers),8 parties are responsible for a different proportion of
questions: almost two-third of all questions were submitted by the PCP (42%) and the BE
(23%), while the remaining questions were shared equally among the PS, PSD and CDS-
PP (each with approximately 11%). At the individual level, PCP and BE MPs ask an
average of 63 and 46 questions, respectively, per session. The figures for the other parties
are much lower, with three from the PS, two from the PSD and ten from the CDS-PP.
Overall, representatives from smaller parties have greater incentives to gain visibility by
acting as a cabinet watchdog.
The main policy content of each question was classified according to one of the 217
categories of the Portuguese policy agenda codebook (www.comparativeagendas.ne
t/portugal) (Belchior and Borghetto 2019). Coding reliability was assured by having two
coders blind-coding the same document simultaneously.9 The two selected topics – crime
and unemployment – correspond to different combinations of policy agenda codes (see
Online Appendix A for more information). Note that not all questions should explicitly
address cases of either unlawful layoffs or criminal offences. We decided to cast our net
wider to capture all instances of activity loosely related to our two issues (e.g. problems of
low salaries in a call centre or personnel issue in Portuguese prisons), since they can still
be taken as a signal to constituents that their MP, on behalf of the party, is taking a
position on issues that are important in the district. We consider this a conservative
approach since it provides a bias against finding the hypothesized link.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of questions across topics and parties. Over the
course of our six-year period, MPs asked 739 questions related to unemployment (6.7%)
8 Three criteria have to be simultaneously present to categorize a question as duplicated: it has a similar title, it is
presented on the same day and it has the same author as another.
9 The average intercoder reliability was around 80% and the remaining differences in coding decisions were
resolved through discussion. In case of disagreement between the coders, the authors made the final decision.
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and 684 related to the area of crime (6.2%). While PCP and BE representatives always ask
more questions than MPs from other parties, this gap is wider on matters of
unemployment, which is historically their signature issue (Lisi 2015). Out of all the MPs in
our sample (n=345), around 75% (n=259) asked at least one question. Of this subgroup,
41% (n=107) and 33% (n=85), respectively, asked at least one question related to either
crime or unemployment, which is indicative of the popularity of these topics among MPs.
On the other hand, we should mention that the distribution of questions is fairly skewed
because of a small number of hyperactive BE and PCP MPs.10
Problem Pressure, Political Localness and Committee Membership
After a careful examination of Portuguese local data indicators available on a yearly basis
and spanning the period 2009 to 2015, we decided to focus on two statistical indicators
available at the municipal level: the share of unemployed people aged 15 to 64 registered
with the public employment office; and the number of registered crimes per thousand
inhabitants. To construct the two versions of our problem pressure variable,11 we first
attributed yearly indicators to the year in which the legislative session started. This was
because our dependent variable is aggregated by legislative sessions and our social
indicators are available by calendar year. This meant that data from 2009 were used to
Figure 1: Distribution of Parliamentary Questions Across Parties and Topics During the 11th and
12th Legislatures
Source: Own data.
10 Descriptive statistics are as follows. For unemployment, mean: 9, SD: 20, min: 1, max: 129. For crime, mean:
6, SD: 12, min: 1, max: 102.
11 See Online Appendix C for more information on the construction of the two problem pressure variables.
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predict behaviour during the first parliamentary session starting in 2009 (running from 15
October 2009 to 15 September 2010), data from 2010 were applied to the 2010
parliamentary session and so on for the remaining sessions. By doing this we created a
temporal lag between the publication of the statistics and our measurement of
parliamentary activity.
We then constructed our two problem pressure indicators. Although the concept of
problem pressure may sound intuitive, its measurement is not straightforward because it
needs a yardstick against which the current situation can be measured. In the analysis that
follows, we have built on two assumptions about how MPs process information about
social problems such as crime and unemployment and draw conclusions as to the severity
of the situation. First, they can compare the situation in their district with the average
district. Second, they can compare current and past district conditions. These correspond
to two versions of our “problem pressure” variable, which we label “across district” and
“across time”. Notice that we are not assuming every MP will perform both types of
comparison – most often they make decisions based on poor information – and we do
have no expectations about their policy-specific effect. On the other hand, lacking a micro-
level theory of agenda-setting, we think it is important to consider both perspectives. The
two variables were constructed as follows:
(a) Across district. We standardized all district-specific indicators in a year. We first
calculated the mean and standard deviation using all district values in a year, then we
subtracted the indicator observed in a district in a year from the yearly mean and
divided it by the yearly standard deviation.
(b) Across time. For the same district we calculated the difference between indicators in t-1
and t0, then divided it by the indicator in t-1 and multiplied it by 100. If the resulting
figure is positive (negative) it means there was an increase (decrease) with respect to the
previous year. For example, the percent change from the year 2009 to year 2010 was
used to predict legislative activity during the first legislative session starting in October
2009.
While H1 tests the net effect of district problem pressure on the number of questions
about that policy area, H2 and H3 look at the conditioning effect of political localness
and committee membership. To test H2, we created a dummy, taking the value of 1 if the
MP had in the past served as either a mayor or as member of the local executive/assembly.
This categorization of MPs is based on their self-authored profiles published on the
Portuguese parliament’s website. To test H3, we proceeded in two steps. First, we detected
whether the MP belonged either to the “Committee on Work and Social Security”
(Comiss~ao de Trabalho e Seguranca Social) for matters related to unemployment, or to the
“Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Freedoms and Guarantees” (Comiss~ao de
Assuntos Constitucionais, Direitos, Liberdades e Garantias) for matters related to crime.
Second, since district characteristics can drive either the self-selection or party-selection of
committee membership, we included the committee variable after purging the effects of
local-level unemployment and crime statistics.12
12 First we regressed committee membership on problem pressure indicators, then we incorporated the stored
residuals as the new committee variables in our main model (see e.g. Waggoner 2019).
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Control Variables
We included a battery of control variables that were found to have an effect on the
likelihood of asking a parliamentary question (regardless of the topic) in previous analyses.
The variable ‘magnitude‘ measures the number of MPs elected within each constituency.
District magnitude in Portugal varies significantly, ranging from Portalegre, which elects
two MPs, to Lisbon, which elects 47.13 The literature on the relationship between electoral
system characteristics and dyadic representation (Carey and Shugart 1995) suggests that, in
closed list systems, incentives to cultivate personal votes increase with decreasing district
magnitude, which may translate into more constituency-focused questions. Electoral
vulnerability measures the degree of uncertainty each MP feels about the prospect of their
re-election. Because of the closed-list proportional system in use in Portugal, we follow
Andre et al. (2015) and measure vulnerability as the ratio between the position the
candidate has on the party list and the number of seats won in that district by the
candidate’s party in the most recent election. For example, the candidate who is second on
a party list winning five seats receives a ratio of 0.4, while the ratio for the candidate
named fifth on that same list is 1. According to some authors (Fernandes et al. 2017;
Russo 2011; Soroka et al. 2009), although not to others (Kellermann 2016; Martin 2011),
electoral vulnerability should correlate positively with the likelihood of asking a question:
vulnerable MPs should have a greater incentive to use parliamentary activities to improve
their position on the list and increase their chances of re-election. ‘Mandates in district‘
measures the absolute number of times an MP was elected in that constituency. These are
candidates who have strong local roots and visibility and who have a reputation that is
consolidated in the opinion of both party leaders and voters. As a result of their electoral
safety, they may often feel less of an incentive to direct their efforts towards parliamentary
questions, leaving this to other less institutionalized MPs.
‘Opposition‘ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the MP was member of an opposition
party and 0 otherwise. Since getting information from or influencing the agenda of
members of the executive through more informal means is generally more difficult for
opposition MPs, they should rely more heavily on parliamentary questions. Next, we
control for the MP’s gender (1 if female) since, based on previous works (Bird 2005), we
expect women MPs to tend to focus more on social policy-related themes (family policy,
care for the elderly, health care). Finally, we included a categorical variable to capture the
MP’s party membership (reference value is PS) as a means of dealing with all the
remaining party-related variables.
The choice of the statistical model for our analysis was driven by two characteristics of
our data. First, the count of sponsored written questions is an integer featuring high over-
dispersion (i.e. the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean). Second, our data
are organized as an unbalanced panel with observation for the same MP spread over
multiple legislative sessions. This might result in correlated outcomes for the same MP,
thus affecting coefficients. As a result, we fitted a hierarchical negative binomial model
with random intercepts for each MP.14
13 Since we do not expect a linear relationship between district magnitude and the likelihood to ask a question,
we transformed district magnitude using the logarithmic function.
14 A comparison between the Akaike information criteria (AIC) of our model specification and that of a
hierarchical zero-inflated negative binomial model (due to the high number of zeros this could be a plausible
model specification) suggested our model was a significantly better fit for the data.
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Results
Starting from H1, Table 2 summarizes the results for the four specifications of our model
(two issues times two operationalizations of problem pressure). Our main predictor,
district-level problem pressure, points in the expected direction – the more severe the
problem, the stronger the response of the MP - and is statistically significant both in the
case of unemployment and crime issues. On the other hand, the results show that
representatives seem to use two different logics to measure the severity of problems in the
two areas. In the case of unemployment, it is the increase with respect to the previous year
that positively affects the probability of questions being asked on the topic; in the case of
crime, it is the difference with respect to the mean level of crime in the country. We
speculate that this may originate from the different temporal dynamic of the two issues in
the years under consideration (see Online Appendix C for an overview of trends on the
two issues). The Euro crisis had a severe effect on unemployment across the country. All
districts experienced a substantial increase in unemployment figures, which reached a peak
around the first session of the XII legislature (2011-2012, namely the first year of the
adjustment program signed with the Troika) and then progressively dropped. It was this
temporal change that triggered a response of the representatives. Vice versa, crime
indicators exhibit a more erratic pattern over time, with few noteworthy peaks.
Table 2: Model Predicting the Absolute Number of Parliamentary Questions on Unemployment and
Crime
Unemployment Crime
Across district Across Time Across district Across Time
Intercept 4.57*** (0.67) 4.78*** (0.67) 2.81*** (0.59) 2.76*** (0.60)
Problem pressure 0.04 (0.12) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.31* (0.12) 0.01 (0.01)
Magnitude(log) 0.26 (0.18) 0.22 (0.17) 0.64*** (0.16) 0.65*** (0.16)
Mandates in district 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
Vulnerability 0.12 (0.19) 0.18 (0.19) 0.16 (0.20) 0.08 (0.20)
Female MP 0.33 (0.33) 0.32 (0.32) 0.26 (0.29) 0.30 (0.29)
Opposition 1.66*** (0.29) 1.73*** (0.29) 1.47*** (0.20) 1.51*** (0.20)
MP localness 0.66 (0.34) 0.64 (0.34) 0.89** (0.30) 0.94** (0.30)
Committee 0.24** (0.09) 0.23** (0.08) 0.53*** (0.11) 0.54*** (0.11)
BE 3.94*** (0.52) 3.83*** (0.52) 2.39*** (0.51) 2.56*** (0.51)
CDS-PP 1.65*** (0.50) 1.57** (0.50) 1.84*** (0.43) 1.94*** (0.44)
PCP 4.54*** (0.49) 4.50*** (0.49) 3.75*** (0.47) 3.89*** (0.48)
PSD 0.46 (0.38) 0.40 (0.38) 0.27 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32)
Random Effects
s00 2.05individual MP 2.07individual MP 2.00individual MP 2.09individual MP
# groups 342individual MP 341individual MP 345individual MP 345individual MP
Observations 1249 1240 1265 1265
AIC 1201.811 1178.073 1529.537 1535.586
Note: Dependent variable: absolute number of questions about unemployment and criminal issues
asked in the 11th and 12th legislatures of the Portuguese Assembleia da Republica.
Model: Hierarchical negative binomial regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance:
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). s00 is the random intercept variance, or between-
subject variance. AIC: Akaike information criterion.
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Turning to our control variables, as expected we find that being member of an opposition
party, especially if it is a small opposition party like the PCP and the BE, is the strongest
predictor of the number of questions submitted. Their MPs are generally more active and,
lacking a voice in the government, give more value to the parliamentary question instrument.
In addition, the cross-topic difference in the magnitude of coefficients for our party effects, to
some extent, reflects our expectations based on issue ownership. Radical left-wing parties such
as the BE and PCP are more active (higher coefficients) in the area of unemployment,
whereas the right-wing CDS-PP is more dynamic in the area of crime.
Another consistent finding across topics and problem specifications is the positive and
significant impact of committee membership (purged of the effect of district
characteristics). Regardless of whether supply (MPs’ preferences for a specific committee)
or demand (party leaders’ decisions) factors prevail in committee assignment, this result
reveals that the division of policy portfolios within parliamentary parties is one of the
main predictors of individual agendas (Louwerse and Otjes 2015; Waggoner 2019).
Also, we confirm previous findings showing that as district magnitude increases, the
number of parliamentary questions decreases (although coefficients are statistically
significant only for crime-related issues). Previous experience as local representatives in
either a legislative or executive body in the district where they were elected influences MPs’
decision to take up an issue only when looking at crime-related questions. On the
contrary, spending many mandates as national representative of a district (mandates in
district), the uncertainty of re-election (vulnerability) and gender do not seem to impact
significantly on the number of questions.15
The effect of the political localness of MPs on responsiveness to problem pressure in the
district (see Table 3) is never statistically significant at conventional levels. Whereas
Fernandes et al. (2017) found that Portuguese MPs with previous experience in local
government ask more district-related questions, we do not find that they signal to their
constituents in response to problem pressure. As a test of the robustness of our findings,
we tried narrower proxies of ‘political localness‘, focusing only on whether the MP was
either a member of a local executive or a mayor in a district municipality, but we still were
not able to statistically eliminate the possibility that the observed relationship results were
anything other than the result of pure chance.
Finally, our analysis partly corroborates H3 (see Table 4). We find a statistically
significant and positive moderating impact of committee membership on the
responsiveness to problem pressure, but it holds true only for crime. It shows that, within
this committee, representatives elected in districts with higher crime rates ask more related
questions.
Conclusions
This article examined whether and to what extent MPs can signal to their electoral district
by sponsoring parliamentary questions on issues that might be considered problematic at
15 To test the robustness of our findings, we applied the same model specifications to predict the number of
policy-relevant parliamentary questions, although this time keeping only those questions making explicit reference
to a geographic entity in the MP’s district. We detected a reference in 34% of unemployment and 46% of crime-
related questions. The coding was done manually using the same coding rules applied by Fernandes et al. (2017:
679). The table of results in Online Appendix D reveals that the results are consistent, although the level of
statistical significance dropped (probably due to the lower number of occurrences in the data set).
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the local level. It focused on Portugal, a country in which an MP’s chances of re-election
depend greatly on the decisions of party elites, so the dyadic relationship between MPs
and their constituencies should be less likely. On the other hand, as Fernandes et al. (2017)
and Zittel et al. (2019) suggest, some form of constituency service may still bring electoral
pay-offs for the party even in countries characterised by a non-preferential electoral
system, and strategic leaders should be eager to leverage the local ties and visibility of
their MPs as a means of strengthening the party label. Additionally, previous studies on
Portugal had already detected evidence of behaviour with a constituency focus (e.g. time
spent in the district), especially by MPs elected in smaller districts (Pilet et al. 2012). This
study has sought to innovate with respect to past analyses by testing whether district
characteristics are factored in by MPs at the moment of deciding the topic of their
parliamentary questioning.
We provided evidence that, at least as far as the two selected issues are concerned,
Portuguese MPs do perform substantive representation of their own constituency by
signalling effort through parliamentary questions. District-specific problem pressure,
measured as variation in crime and unemployment statistics, is associated with a greater
propensity of the MP to focus on the issue through sponsored parliamentary questions.
This is an interesting finding that contributes new knowledge to the ongoing debate on the
Table 3: Model Predicting the Absolute Number of Parliamentary Questions on Unemployment and
Crime testing H2
Unemployment Crime
Across district Across time Across district Across time
Intercept 4.61*** (0.68) 4.79*** (0.67) 2.81*** (0.60) 2.75*** (0.60)
Problem pressure 0.01 (0.13) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.31* (0.14) 0.01 (0.02)
Magnitude(log) 0.27 (0.18) 0.22 (0.17) 0.64*** (0.16) 0.65*** (0.16)
Mandates in district 0.03 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.07 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
Vulnerability 0.13 (0.19) 0.18 (0.19) 0.16 (0.20) 0.08 (0.20)
Female MP 0.33 (0.33) 0.33 (0.32) 0.26 (0.29) 0.30 (0.29)
Opposition 1.66*** (0.29) 1.73*** (0.29) 1.47*** (0.20) 1.51*** (0.20)
MP localness 0.64 (0.34) 0.66 (0.35) 0.90** (0.31) 0.92** (0.31)
Committee 0.23** (0.09) 0.23** (0.08) 0.53*** (0.11) 0.54*** (0.11)
BE 3.97*** (0.52) 3.83*** (0.52) 2.39*** (0.51) 2.56*** (0.51)
CDS-PP 1.65** (0.51) 1.57** (0.50) 1.83*** (0.43) 1.94*** (0.44)
PCP 4.57*** (0.50) 4.50*** (0.49) 3.75*** (0.47) 3.89*** (0.48)
PSD 0.49 (0.38) 0.40 (0.38) 0.27 (0.32) 0.33 (0.32)
Problem pressure* MP
localness
0.21 (0.27) 0.00 (0.01) 0.03 (0.28) 0.01 (0.03)
Random Effects
s00 2.10individual MP 2.07individual MP 2.00individual MP 2.09individual MP
# groups 342individual MP 341individual MP 345individual MP 345individual MP
Observations 1249 1240 1265 1265
AIC 1203.227 1180.021 1531.524 1537.424
Note: Dependent variable: absolute number of questions about unemployment and criminal issues
asked in the 11th and 12th legislatures of the Portuguese Assembleia da Republica.
Model: Hierarchical Negative Binomial regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance:
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). s00 is the random intercept variance, or between-
subject variance. AIC: Akaike information criterion.
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factors accounting for the representative relationship between MPs and constituents,
particularly with regard to the impact of district-level characteristics (D€aubler 2018).
Furthermore, we detect evidence of this constituency link in a least-likely country case,
Portugal, which leads us to expect stronger or, at least, similar patterns in political systems
using preferential electoral systems. On the other hand, the evidence is less conclusive on
whether this effect is conditioned on political localness or committee membership. Further
studies are warranted on the microlevel foundations of the patterns observed in the
present analysis.
Another consistent finding in our analysis is the influence of committee membership on
an MP’s decision to take up an issue, which suggests the importance of the division of
labour and policy specialization within Portuguese parliamentary groups. Interestingly,
these results are concordant with those on the MP-constituency relationship in a different
legislature, the US Congress, leading the author to conclude that “while constituents may
play a role, at best it seems that it is an indirect and mixed one, with institutional factors
such as committee membership being a much more consistent driver of issue sponsorship”
(Waggoner 2019: 732).
Future research should address the limitations of this study by expanding the time
interval, looking at different signalling instruments (e.g. bill sponsorship) as well as
Table 4: Model Predicting the Absolute Number of Parliamentary Questions on Unemployment and
Crime testing H3
Unemployment Crime
Across district Across time Across district Across time
Intercept 4.57*** (0.67) 4.76*** (0.67) 2.63*** (0.58) 2.76*** (0.60)
Problem pressure 0.04 (0.12) 0.02*** (0.00) 0.30* (0.12) 0.01 (0.01)
Magnitude(log) 0.26 (0.18) 0.22 (0.17) 0.63*** (0.15) 0.65*** (0.16)
Mandates in district 0.02 (0.07) 0.00 (0.07) 0.04 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06)
Vulnerability 0.12 (0.19) 0.17 (0.19) 0.10 (0.19) 0.09 (0.20)
Female MP 0.33 (0.33) 0.33 (0.32) 0.24 (0.28) 0.30 (0.29)
Opposition 1.66*** (0.29) 1.73*** (0.29) 1.45*** (0.19) 1.51*** (0.20)
MP localness 0.66 (0.34) 0.64 (0.34) 0.84** (0.29) 0.94** (0.30)
Committee 0.24** (0.09) 0.20* (0.08) 0.38*** (0.11) 0.55*** (0.11)
BE 3.94*** (0.52) 3.83*** (0.52) 2.28*** (0.49) 2.57*** (0.51)
CDS-PP 1.65*** (0.50) 1.57** (0.50) 1.77*** (0.42) 1.94*** (0.44)
PCP 4.54*** (0.49) 4.49*** (0.49) 3.76*** (0.45) 3.89*** (0.48)
PSD 0.46 (0.38) 0.40 (0.38) 0.21 (0.31) 0.33 (0.32)
Problem pressure*
Committee
0.00 (0.07) 0.00 (0.00) 0.31** (0.09) 0.00 (0.01)
Random Effects
s00 2.05individual MP 2.07individual MP 1.85individual MP 2.09individual MP
# groups 342individual MP 341individual MP 345individual MP 345individual MP
Observations 1249 1240 1265 1265
AIC 1203.811 1179.084 1520.304 1537.524
Note: Dependent variable: absolute number of questions about unemployment and criminal issues
asked in the 11th and 12th legislatures of the Portuguese Assembleia da Republica.
Model: Hierarchical Negative Binomial regression. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance:
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests). s00 is the random intercept variance, or between-
subject variance. AIC: Akaike information criterion.
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integrating the insights of large-N analysis with qualitative data on the motivations driving
the agenda decisions of MPs. Furthermore, the increasing availability of large data sets
coding the policy content of parliamentary behaviour (e.g. Borghetto and Chaques-
Bonafont 2019) should pave the way for testing whether the finding on the influence of
district problem pressure for patterns of issue sponsorship holds across different
institutional configurations and policy areas.
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